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From Schoolhouse Gate to Locker Room Door:
The Student Athlete’s Constitutional Right
to Protest at a Public University
Does Not Stop at the Hardwood
KATHARINE WATERS†
The Supreme Court has not faced a case involving the public university student athlete’s right to
protest during game day events, such as during the pre-game warm up, the national anthem, and
game play itself. Protests stemming from the arena of sports is nothing new, and athletes are
supported by a long and rich history of influential professional athletes making their mark on civil
rights movements. In light of recent and tragic killings of Black Americans at the hands of police,
collegiate student athletes have begun to use their platform to raise awareness and express their
political viewpoints. As a result, conservative lawmakers have urged public universities to act
and wholly prohibit such protests in response to players electing to kneel during the national
anthem.
This Note explores the current network of student free speech jurisprudence and applies the
existing framework to a set of modern protests frequently observed across collegiate athletics:
kneeling at the national anthem; wearing non-uniform, warm-up t-shirts with symbolic messages
such as “Black Lives Matter,” “Arrest the Cops Who Killed Breonna Taylor,” and “All Players
United”; and wearing symbolic gear such as an armband during game play. Building on existing
jurisprudence, this Note forecasts that student athletes at public universities have the
constitutional right to protest subject to reasonable limitations.

† Katharine Waters, J.D. 2022, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I would like to
give special thanks to Professor Zachary Price for mentoring my research and writing process of this Note. To
my parents, David Waters and Julia Young, for everything you have done, continue to do, and will inevitably
do, thank you for it all. To my brother, Matt Waters, for being my biggest supporter. To Alexander Garcia, for
reviewing every version of this Note as well as listening to and discussing every new constitutional rabbit hole
uncovered during this Note’s research. Each of these people played an important role in this Note’s creation,
and I have them all to thank for everything. Additional thanks to the Hastings Law Journal for selecting this
Note for publication and for all the hours of editing and reviewing. It took a village, and I am grateful to them
all.
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INTRODUCTION
Protest in sports today evokes an image of the controversial choice by San
Francisco 49ers’ quarterback, Colin Kaepernick, to kneel during the national
anthem in 2016 to peacefully protest the systemic oppression of Black people,
and people of color, in America.1 In doing so, Kaepernick ignited new interest
in America’s social justice movements, launching waves of support in
professional and amateur athletics.2 While Kaepernick is now a household name
when discussing social justice and Black Lives Matter protests in America, he
was preceded by a long and rich history of protest in sports.3 These protests date
back as early as the Byzantine empire4 but, more recently and better known,
have continued with Olympic Gold and Silver medalists Jesse Owens and Jackie
Robinson in the 1938 Berlin Games.5 A short thirty years later in 1968, Olympic
Gold and Bronze medalists Tommie Smith and John Carlos famously raised
their fists and lowered their heads in a Black Power salute following the
assassination of the great Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. months earlier.6 Protest in
athletics is nothing new.7
Under current law, student free speech is mostly safeguarded under Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, a broad and sweeping
case in favor of public-school students’ First Amendment rights. The Supreme
Court famously stated, “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”8
So, what exactly happens when collegiate student athletes take free speech
to the field or the hardwood? Student athletes at public universities have faced
significant backlash for choosing to kneel during the anthem and expressing
messages in solidarity with Black lives.9 In response to these peaceful protests,
1. Steve Wyche, Colin Kaepernick Explains Why He Sat During National Anthem, NFL NEWS (Aug. 27,
2016, 3:04 AM), https://www.nfl.com/news/colin-kaepernick-explains-why-he-sat-during-national-anthem0ap3000000691077; see also Steve Wulf, Athletes and Activism: The Long, Defiant History of Sports Protests,
ANDSCAPE (Jan. 30, 2019), https://andscape.com/features/athletes-and-activism-the-long-defiant-history-ofsports-protests.
2. See Jason Reid, How Colin Kaepernick Became a Cause for Activists, Civil Rights Groups and Others,
ANDSCAPE (Aug. 22, 2017), https://andscape.com/features/how-colin-kaepernick-became-a-cause-for-activistscivil-rights-groups; see also Wulf, supra note 1.
3. Wulf, supra note 1.
4. Id.; Mike Dash, Blue Versus Green: Rocking the Byzantine Empire, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Mar. 2,
2012), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/blue-versus-green-rocking-the-byzantine-empire-113325928.
5. Wulf, supra note 1.
6. Mélissa Godin, Athletes Will Be Banned from Protesting at the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. But the Games
Have a Long History of Political Demonstrations, TIME (Jan. 14, 2020), https://time.com/5764614/politicalprotests-olympics-ioc-ban.
7. See Wulf, supra note 1.
8. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
9. See Blake Summers, State Lawmakers Call on University Leaders to Stop Athletes from Kneeling
During National Anthem, NEWS 4 NASHVILLE (Feb. 24, 2021), https://tn-archive.wsmv.com/news/statelawmakers-call-on-university-leaders-to-stop-athletes-from-kneeling-during-national-anthem/article_
f466b170-7656-11eb-aa15-3f3afd7576fc.html.
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lawmakers have urged public universities to implement policies prohibiting
these protests while bearing the school’s name.10
This Note aims to predict how the Supreme Court will handle public
university policies restricting student athletes’ free speech in their capacity as
athletes under current precedent. In doing so, public university policies
prohibiting student athlete protests—such as kneeling and wearing certain nonuniform gear on game day—will be deemed unconstitutional under West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette and Tinker.
Part I of this Note explores the rich history of protest in professional and
amateur athletics, which paved the way for social justice protests in collegiate
sports today. Part I will also explore relevant scholarship and present the open
question facing the Supreme Court with respect to student athlete free speech
rights in game play. Part II of this Note explores First Amendment doctrine and
collegiate student athlete free speech precedent. Part III of this Note applies
student free speech jurisprudence to modern exemplars, such as kneeling during
the anthem and wearing non-uniform gear during warm-ups and throughout
games. Part III predicts that, should the Supreme Court face this open question,
the Court will protect student athletes’ right to kneel during the national anthem
under Barnette and Tinker. Likewise, the Supreme Court will protect certain
non-uniform gear under Tinker but subject to Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser and Morse v. Frederick. This Note briefly concludes, summarizing the
public university student athlete’s constitutional right to protest on game day.
I. PROTEST IN AMERICA IS NOTHING NEW, THOUGH QUESTIONS ON THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROTEST IN COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
REMAIN UNANSWERED
Across many platforms, discussions and protests have erupted in light of
social justice issues in America, especially surrounding recent killings of Black
Americans.11 It has become increasingly common to see athletes, both
professional and amateur, use their platforms to discuss these highly relevant
social and racial justice issues. Subsequently, there has been strong opposition
in response to protests and demonstrations at athletic events, that centers on the
argument that athletes should instead simply “stick to sports.”12 However, those
in opposition may not understand and certainly do not appreciate the long and
rich history of protest in athletics. Athletes throughout history have been using
their platforms to shed light on difficult realities surrounding social and racial

10. Id.
11. Wyche, supra note 1; see also Amy O’Kruk, A Look at Police Brutality in America, NBC BOS. (July
1, 2020), https://www.nbcboston.com/news/national-international/a-look-at-police-brutality-in-america/
2152297.
12. Armando Salguero, Dear Sports: Stick to Sports, MIA. HERALD (Oct. 1, 2017),
https://www.miamiherald.com/sports/spt-columns-blogs/armando-salguero/article176389926.html.

July 2022

FROM SCHOOLHOUSE GATE TO LOCKER ROOM DOOR

1597

inequality in their communities, global human rights violations, anti-war
viewpoints, and more.13
Outcries in professional and amateur athletics to social injustice and racial
inequity are commonly seen in America’s history.14 Jackie Robinson wrote in
his autobiography, “I cannot stand and sing the anthem. I cannot salute the flag;
I know that I am a black man in a white world.”15 Colin Kaepernick shocked
conservative America, first sitting and later kneeling in protest against police
brutality and racism in America.16 Although Kaepernick’s protest against racial
injustice is not a new position for an athlete to take, conservative America has
been up in arms, telling athletes to “stick to sports”17 and to “shut up and
dribble.”18 As Armando Salguero of the Miami Herald ironically exclaimed,
“[i]t’s sad that in 2017 America[,] that’s a controversial stance.”19 But what is
sadly deemed “that controversial stance?” As Salguero puts it, it is not sad that
in America in 2017 (and today), that systemic racism,20 police brutality,21 and
white supremacy22 pervade the daily experience of people of color in America,23
but that athletes will not “stick to sports” because—despite Black Americans
being murdered at alarming rates24—Salguero “just want[s] to relax[,] . . . eat[]
a hot dog and watch[] football.”25
Athletes have famously protested to shed light on issues facing their
communities, which recently have surrounded police brutality and racism26 in
13. Shannon Ryan, Timeline: A Look Back at Some of the Most Prominent Protests Over the Years, CHI.
TRIB. (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/ct-athlete-protests-timeline-liststory-20200909yl4x7b3hk5gkxj5wdxqwdmxfrq-list.html; Nikole Tower, Olympic Project for Human Rights Lit Fire for 1968
Protests, GLOB. SPORT MATTERS (Oct. 8, 2018), https://globalsportmatters.com/mexico/2018/10/08/olympicproject-for-human-rights-lit-fire-for-1968-protests; Camilla Bauduin, The Importance of Athlete Activism and
Protest Through Sports, FRANKLIN POST (Apr. 30, 2018), https://fhspost.com/the-importance-of-athleteactivism-and-protest-through-sports.
14. Wulf, supra note 1.
15. JACKIE ROBINSON, I NEVER HAD IT MADE xxiv (HarperCollins Publishers 1995) (1972).
16. Wyche, supra note 1.
17. Salguero, supra note 12.
18. Emily Sullivan, Laura Ingraham Told LeBron James to Shut Up and Dribble; He Went to the Hoop,
NPR (Feb. 19, 2018, 5:04 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/19/587097707/lauraingraham-told-lebron-james-to-shutup-and-dribble-he-went-to-the-hoop.
19. Salguero, supra note 12.
20. Justin Worland, America’s Long Overdue Awakening to Systemic Racism, TIME (June 11, 2020, 6:41
AM), https://time.com/5851855/systemic-racism-america.
21. See O’Kruk, supra note 11.
22. Ursula Moffitt, White Supremacists Who Stormed the US Capitol Are Only the Most Visible Product
of Racism, THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 15, 2021, 8:22 AM), https://theconversation.com/white-supremacists-whostormed-us-capitol-are-only-the-most-visible-product-of-racism-152295; Michael German, Hidden in Plain
Sight: Racism, White Supremacy, and Far-Right Militancy in Law Enforcement, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/hidden-plain-sight-racism-whitesupremacy-and-far-right-militancy-law.
23. See Wyche, supra note 1.
24. Frank Edwards, Hedwig Lee & Michael Esposito, Risk of Being Killed by Police Use of Force in the
United States by Age, Race-Ethnicity, and Sex, 116 PROCS. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 16793, 16793 (2019).
25. Salguero, supra note 12.
26. See, e.g., Wyche, supra note 1.
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America but historically have included protests against South Africa’s
apartheid,27 war,28 and other causes. In an article on Colin Kaepernick’s 2016
protests, Jack Tien-Dana wrote that for America to blatantly ignore such difficult
conversations is “an assertion of control, [and] a maintenance of the status quo,
no matter how broken it is or how many people it fails.”29 To Colin Kaepernick,
“this is bigger than football and it would be selfish on [his] part to look the other
way. There are bodies in the street, and people getting paid leave and getting
away with murder.”30 The use of a more public facing platform, such as
professional and amateur athletics, helps mobilize and inspire local leaders to do
the same in their communities.31 It gives a voice to the voiceless. It empowers
communities to fight for change and it provides leaders to look to and follow.
Undisputedly, “[r]ace and sports are deeply intertwined.”32
Social and racial injustices followed by outcries and protests within
athletics are nothing new.33 Today’s most common examples of protest in
athletics are kneeling during the national anthem,34 wearing non-uniform gear—
such as “Black Lives Matter” shirts35 and “All Players United” (“APU”) wrist
bands36—and more rarely, non-participation in games or practices.37
The modern student athlete is considerably more influential, nationally,
than those in decades past. With the rise in national recognition through
broadcasting and social media, student athletes have a greater platform than ever
before. Likewise, universities draw in substantially more money than ever before
from collegiate sports, especially in men’s football and basketball. For example,
27. Tower, supra note 13; Bauduin, supra note 13.
28. Ryan, supra note 13 (highlighting Muhammed Ali’s 1966 refusal of the Vietnam War draft).
29. Jack Tien-Dana, The Fallacy of “Stick to Sports” Has Never Been Clearer, INSIDEHOOK (June 3, 2020,
12:36 PM), https://www.insidehook.com/article/sports/fallacy-stick-to-sports.
30. Mary Harvey, Why Activist Athletes Are Needed Today More Than Ever, WORLD ECON. F. (July 9,
2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/07/athlete-activists-needed-more-than-ever.
31. Adam Jude, How Colin Kaepernick Inspired Activism, Awareness and Seattle Athletes to Speak Out
Against Racial Injustice, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 27, 2020, 9:35 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/pacific-nwmagazine/aug-30-cover-story.
32. James N. Druckman, Adam J. Howat & Jacob E. Rothschild, Political Protesting, Race, and College
Athletics: Why Diversity Among Coaches Matters, 100 SOC. SCI. Q. 1009, 1010 (2019).
33. See Wulf, supra note 1.
34. See Celine Castronuovo, NCAA Players Take a Knee During National Anthem, THE HILL (Mar. 19,
2021, 3:45 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/news/544076-ncaa-players-take-a-knee-during-national-anthem;
Joanne Kavanagh, Raising Awareness: What Is the Meaning Behind Taking the Knee and Why Is It So
Important?, THE SUN (Feb. 14, 2022, 10:02 AM), https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/11771451/take-a-kneemeaning-history-blm.
35. Caitlin PenzeyMoog, 50 Photos of the Sports World Showing Support for Black Lives, STACKER (Aug.
4, 2021), https://stacker.com/stories/5115/50-photos-sports-world-showing-support-black-lives; see also Kyle
Melnick, With ‘Black Lives Matter’ Shirts at Issue, These Prep Athletes Experienced the Tension of Activism,
WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2021/03/10/with-black-lives-mattershirts-these-prep-athletes-experienced-tension-activism.
36. Daniel Uthman, Michigan State to Wear APU Wristbands vs. Minnesota, USA TODAY: SPORTS (Nov.
30, 2013, 11:55 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/11/30/apu-all-players-unitedmichigan-state-ramogi-huma-wristbands/3790689.
37. Michael McKnight, How the Missouri Football Protest Changed College Sports Forever, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.si.com/college/2020/11/05/missouri-protests-daily-cover.
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in 2019, the University of Texas at Austin football program was valued at $1.1
billion,38 and the University of Louisville men’s basketball program raked in
$30 million in profits.39
Modern student athletes have even shown that their influence can make
lasting change in state legislatures. For example, student athlete Kylin Hill, of
Mississippi State University’s football team, was credited with being the “final
push for state lawmakers to change Mississippi’s state flag, which up until
January 2021 was the last in the nation to retain the Confederate battle
emblem.”40
These protests have provoked significant backlash by school
administrations and state legislatures, who have lobbied for preventative and
prohibitive policies to effectively silence athlete protest during game day
events.41 Additionally, these institutions have advocated for disciplinary
measures against student athletes who have participated in protests.42 In early
2021, the East Tennessee State University men’s basketball team and the
University of Tennessee women’s basketball team each elected to kneel during
the national anthem.43 Republican State Senators sent a joint signed letter to the
Chancellors and Presidents of all Tennessee public universities stating that when
the students “put on their uniforms, they are representing the university and even
the citizens” of the state.44 Senator Mark Pody further clarified his position on
student athletes’ ability to protest when he stated that he and his fellow
lawmakers “want those students to have the right to express themselves when

38. Brad Crawford, College Football’s 15 Most Valuable Programs in 2019, 247SPORTS (Apr. 1, 2019),
https://247sports.com/LongFormArticle/Alabama-Crimson-Tide-Texas-Ohio-State-Michigan-college-footballmost-valuable-programs-130761488/#130761488_9.
39. Chris Smith, The Most-Valuable College Basketball Teams, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2019/03/12/the-most-valuable-college-basketballteams/?sh=6c2730103225.
40. Greta Anderson, On the Offensive and in the Lead, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 2, 2020),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/07/02/athletes-push-and-achieve-social-justice-goals;
Veronica
Stracqualursi, Mississippi Ratifies and Raises Its New State Flag over the State Capitol for the First Time, CNN:
POLS. (Jan. 13, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/12/politics/mississippi-new-state-flag-flown/
index.html.
41. Summers, supra note 9; Sergio Martínez-Beltrán, Tennessee GOP Lawmakers Want to Ban StudentAthletes from Kneeling Following ETSU Protest, WPLN NEWS (Feb. 23, 2021), https://wpln.org/post/tennesseegop-lawmakers-want-to-ban-student-athletes-from-kneeling-following-etsu-protest.
42. See Summers, supra note 9; Martínez-Beltrán, supra note 41.
43. The Lady Volunteers of the University of Tennessee were seen kneeling during their season opener.
Mechelle Voepel, Most of Tennessee Lady Volunteers Players Kneel During National Anthem in Wake of Capitol
Riot, ESPN (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.espn.com/womens-college-basketball/story/_/id/30671289/mosttennessee-lady-volunteers-players-kneel-national-anthem-wake-capitol-riot. This was followed by the men’s
basketball team at East Tennessee State University also taking a knee during the national anthem. MartínezBeltrán, supra note 41; Michael A. Fletcher, East Tennessee Men’s Basketball Players Convinced Their Coach
Resigned Because of Kneeling Controversy, ESPN (Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.espn.com/mens-collegebasketball/story/_/id/31178371/east-tennessee-men-basketball-players-convinced-their-coach-resignedkneeling-controversy.
44. Summers, supra note 9.
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they’re on their own. When they’re not representing the state of Tennessee.”45
He equated student athletes and the university to a typical employee and
company relationship, asserting that an employee has First Amendment rights
when expressing as an individual but must abide by rules and codes of ethics
when representing the company.46 In this open letter to Tennessee public
universities, Republican State Senators urged adoption of policies prohibiting
student athletes from kneeling during the national anthem.47 Conversely,
Democratic Senator Antonio Parkinson asserts that these “students are simply
exercising their right to free speech.”48 Even though student athletes have gained
national recognition and influence through their public-facing platforms, student
athletes are students first and foremost, and thus should be treated accordingly.49
At the intersection of this long-standing, powerful history of athletes
refusing to “stick to sports” and some lawmakers urging prohibitions on
collegiate student athletes’ free speech, the question remains: to what extent can
a public university prohibit or police protests when student athletes bear the
uniform on game day?50
In the context of public high schools, First Amendment scholar Noel
Johnson begins to tackle a point of contention between the student athlete’s free
speech rights on campus and a coach’s ability to maintain order and control and
to impart developmental skills to his players.51 Johnson articulates that Tinker—
a broad sweeping pro-student free speech case discussed at length in Parts II and
III of this Note—certainly controls in the athletic context at the high school level,
but that the Tinker standard should be balanced considering a coach’s need to
maintain authority and camaraderie.52 Johnson notes that “[c]omplaints about
playing time and coaching methods are a far cry from the bold political statement
made by several students in the turbulent 1960s[,]” referencing the political

45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. Id.
47. Letter signed by Lieutenant Governor Randy McNally, Senator Paul Bailey, Senator Mike Bell and
other Republican Senators to the Chancellors and Presidents of the Tennessee Public Universities can be located
directly from Senator Paul Bailey’s twitter feed, among other sources. Senator Paul Bailey (@PaulBaileyforTN),
TWITTER (Feb. 23, 2021, 10:47 AM), https://twitter.com/PaulBaileyforTN/status/1364285667077947396; see
also Luke Kenton, All 27 Republicans in Tennessee Senate Sign Letter to the State’s Universities Urging Them
to PROHIBIT Student Athletes from Kneeling During National Anthem After Men’s College Basketball Team
Took the Knee Last Week, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 23, 2021, 5:38 PM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article9292229/GOP-Senators-Tennessee-pen-letter-states-universities-urging-ban-kneeling-protests.html.
48. Summers, supra note 9.
49. Amanda
Carroll,
Students
First,
Not
Athletes,
ATHLETE
NETWORK:
BLOG
https://an.athletenetwork.com/blog/students-first-not-athletes (last visited July 1, 2022).
50. Part II of this Note will set up the legal framework governing student athlete protests. Part III of this
Note will show how, under the proper framework, a court will handle these difficult questions and, in most cases,
find that the student athlete has the right to protest during game day activities.
51. Noel Johnson, Tinker Takes the Field: Do Student Athletes Shed Their Constitutional Rights at the
Locker Room Gate?, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 293, 293–94 (2010).
52. Id. at 314.
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backdrop of Tinker and the Supreme Court’s recognition that “core political
speech strikes closer to the heart of the First Amendment . . . .”53
Tinker has also received some backlash following a scathing concurrence
by Justice Thomas in Morse, which called for an abandonment of Tinker and
student free speech rights at public schools.54 In light of Thomas’ concurrence,
First Amendment scholars such as Clay Calvert explored Tinker’s apparent
midlife crisis as exceptions continually whittle away at Tinker’s once powerful
latitude.55 While Tinker has been sidestepped in many circumstances, Calvert
asserts that Tinker still stands today. But it certainly remains at risk should the
Supreme Court continue to carve exceptions and ultimately silence Tinker.56
II. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE PROTECTING STUDENTS
WITHIN THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE
Under this historic backdrop, the rights of student athletes remain an
unanswered question at the Supreme Court when the intersection of student free
speech rights and collegiate athletes at public universities converge at game day.
To begin to unravel and answer this question, First Amendment jurisprudence,
lower court collegiate athlete protest cases, and the legal framework governing
student speech will be explored.
The First Amendment fundamentally establishes that “Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”57 The First Amendment sets out to protect fundamental rights of
the people from government restrictions. Freedom of expression, which includes
freedom of speech, is thought to be one of the most fundamental, core matrices
of rights that every American enjoys.58 First Amendment free speech protections
include both pure and symbolic speech. This includes protections for verbal and
nonverbal expressions where at the core, the “speaker” is communicating or
abstaining from communicating some idea.59
It is well-established that a public university is a state actor through the
Fourteenth Amendment and thus is subject to limitations when disciplining and
limiting students’ and employees’ right to protest while on campus.60 As the
Tinker Court famously said, “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at

53. Id. at 311, 314.
54. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410–11 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
55. See e.g., Clay Calvert, Tinker’s Midlife Crisis: Tattered and Transgressed but Still Standing, 58 AM.
U. L. REV. 1167, 1169 (2009).
56. Id. at 1191.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
58. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1237 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 5th ed. 2017).
59. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); W. Va. St. Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
60. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (citing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).
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the schoolhouse gate.”61 This principle has inspired scholars to explore
constitutional questions and intricacies within the schoolhouse walls,62 and for
attorneys to vehemently defend students’ constitutional rights.63 These issues
have historically resulted in bitter controversy and still remain significant points
of contention today.64
It is important to understand the current First Amendment framework and
obstacles that student athletes may face in order to properly determine the
controlling standards and jurisprudence for analyzing collegiate student athlete
protest. Subpart A discusses student free speech jurisprudence as it stands today,
and Subpart B highlights two collegiate student athlete protests that were
challenged in lower courts and how they were framed under existing free speech
jurisprudence.
A. THE STUDENT’S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PROTEST UNDER THE FREE
SPEECH CLAUSE AND ITS LIMITATIONS
There are six key Supreme Court cases that establish how a state may
regulate student speech in a public-school setting. Barnette established that
under compelled speech principles, students cannot be required to stand and
pledge allegiance to the flag.65 Broadly, Tinker holds that student speech may be
restricted only under the substantial disruption test. Tinker controls expression
unless the expression is subject to one of the enumerated exceptions. These
exceptions come from Fraser, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, and
Morse. Fraser controls speech that is deemed “vulgar, lewd, obscene, and
plainly offensive.”66 Hazelwood governs what the Supreme Court of the United
States deemed “school-sponsored speech,”67 and Morse allows prohibitions on
pro-drug rhetoric and violent-threat related speech by students.68 Finally and
most recently, the Supreme Court in Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L.
unsurprisingly reaffirmed a significant limitation and—relying on Tinker—held
that a public high school student’s off-campus speech stating, “Fuck school fuck
cheer fuck softball fuck everything[,]” was largely outside of the school’s
disciplinary reach, despite the context of the speech relating to the subject of

61. Id. at 506.
62. See generally JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE SUPREME COURT,
AND THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND (2018).
63. Tinker v. Des Moines - Landmark Supreme Court Ruling on Behalf of Student Expression, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/tinker-v-des-moines-landmark-supreme-court-ruling-behalf-student-expression
(last visited July 1, 2022).
64. See Voepel, supra note 43.
65. 319 U.S. at 642.
66. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684–86 (1986).
67. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267–70 (1988).
68. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 398, 409–10 (2007); see also Calvert, supra note 55, at 1170.
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extracurricular activities.69 Notably, there are reasonable exceptions to
Mahanoy’s “geographical” limitation, which turns on a speech’s context, such
as harassment, bullying, threats, and failure to follow rules concerning lessons
among others.70
Generally, Barnette concerns the ability for students to abstain from
participation in patriotic ceremonies but offers no protection for affirmative
expression itself.71 When speech is uttered expressly or symbolically while on
campus, Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse control. When off-campus
speech is disciplined, Mahanoy is instructive and controlling.72 Under Tinker,
the issue is framed as what student speech a school must tolerate.73 Fraser and
Morse each determine categories of speech that can be outright barred.74
However, Hazelwood concerns whether a school is required to affirmatively
promote or endorse certain student speech, thus conferring more discretion to
school administrations to censor student speech.75
Before Barnette, student free speech rights were significantly limited. It
was traditionally understood that schools had a wide breadth of latitude to
discipline a student who caused any sort of disturbance or disruption. A wave of
student free speech cases swept across the courts after Jehovah’s Witnesses
shocked the nation and became “unlikely champions” of the First Amendment.76
In the seminal Barnette case, the Barnette sisters had committed apparent
“insubordination” by not adhering to the recent school board policy that required
all students to stand for the Pledge of Allegiance.77 The consequence of refusal
was being barred from school.78 The sisters were subsequently informed that

69. B.L. posted to her Snapchat Story an image of herself and another student with the caption “Fuck
school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything” in response to learning that she had not made her school’s
varsity cheer team. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2043 (2021). This photo was taken and
posted while off campus and outside of school hours. Id. at 2042–43. The school was only aware of this photo
due to other students viewing the Snapchat Story and bringing it to the cheer coach’s attention. Id. at 2043.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that while the language in the speech was vulgar to some, there was little
to no disruption as a result and subsequent discipline of B.L. was unconstitutional. Id. at 2047–48.
70. Id. at 2045.
71. See W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
72. Ultimately Mahanoy is distinguishable on its facts from the open question discussed in this Note
because Mahanoy involved off-campus speech, whereas this Note highlights speech occurring while outside of
a curricular school setting but certainly not off-campus. However, Mahanoy is relevant to this Note for two main
purposes. First, it reaffirms that Tinker and subsequent cases are still good law and relevant for analytical
purposes. Second, Justice Breyer in his majority opinion and Justice Alito in his concurrence offer some
important dicta and general treatment of student free speech that will be discussed throughout this Note.
73. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988).
74. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 398, 409–10 (2007); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 682 (1986); see also Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 770–72 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying
Morse in the context of student speech threatening violence against a student body).
75. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270–71.
76. Sarah
Barringer
Gordon,
What
We
Owe
Jehovah’s
Witnesses,
HIST.
NET
https://www.historynet.com/what-we-owe-jehovahs-witnesses.htm (last visited July 1, 2022).
77. DRIVER, supra note 62, at 62.
78. Id.
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they were no longer welcomed at their middle school.79 The Supreme Court
determined that compelled speech does not require words to be uttered but can
include acts against one’s will, which includes compelling a student to
participate in the Pledge of Allegiance.80 As it stands today, it is unconstitutional
to require a student to stand for patriotic ceremonies.81 It should be noted that
Barnette does not stand to confer any affirmative right to express a viewpoint.
Rather, Barnette simply asserts that a student cannot be compelled to stand, as
it is a form of compelled speech antithetical to free speech values.
On the other hand, when a student expresses a particular viewpoint while
in a public-school setting, Tinker, Fraser, Morse, and Hazelwood control. Under
the Tinker standard—also known as the “substantial disruption” test—public
school administration “cannot infringe on their students’ right to free and
unrestricted expression . . . under the First Amendment to the Constitution,
where the exercise of such rights in the school buildings and schoolrooms do not
materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school.”82 The Tinker Court adopted this
standard from the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Burnside v. Byers and extended it
by stating, “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough
to overcome the right to freedom of expression.”83 Even when statements by
students “may start an argument or cause a disturbance . . . our Constitution says
we must take that risk . . . .”84 From a policy perspective, the Court noted that
“our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of
openness—that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and
vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often
disputatious, society.”85
In Tinker, students were disciplined by their school for electing to wear a
plain black armband during school hours, which symbolized their protest against
the Vietnam War.86 When the principal caught wind of plans to protest, he
announced a school policy stating that students who wore the armbands would
be asked to remove it.87 The policy further stated that if a student refused to
adhere to a removal request, the student would be suspended.88 The Tinker
children and others wore these armbands and after refusing to remove them,

79. Id.
80. W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”).
81. Id.
82. Burnside v. Byers, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (emphasis added); see also Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509, 514 (1969) (citing Burnside).
83. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 (emphasis added).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 508–09.
86. Id. at 504.
87. DRIVER, supra note 62, at 74.
88. Id.
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were suspended and could not return to school until after the demonstration was
planned to end—a period of roughly two weeks.89
The Court ruled in favor of the Tinker children and established broad
protection for students, within reason, holding it unconstitutional to discipline
students exercising their First Amendment rights.90 The Supreme Court found it
especially important that the protest did not interfere with the educational
mission of the school nor detract from any other students’ rights in the process.91
While schools had traditionally been given wide latitude to maintain
authority and discipline students in carrying out their educational mission, the
Tinker Court conferred significant power to students.92 Thus, the Tinker Court
held that a public school and its affiliates cannot discipline or restrict student
speech unless the speech would cause actual substantial disruption to others.93
The Tinker Court articulated another standard that has not been tested at length
but stands to hold that student speech may not invade the rights of others, and
thus subsequent discipline for such speech would be sanctioned.94
Tinker stood unchallenged for roughly fifteen years, until the Supreme
Court considered constitutional questions raised by a crude assembly speech by
a bold middle schooler that left his school’s administrators shocked and quite
displeased.95 As a result of Fraser, the first Tinker exception was enumerated.
In Fraser, a student delivered a sexually charged speech, utilizing
numerous graphic innuendos, during a student body assembly at his middle
school.96 The assembly room, with upwards of 600 students, erupted, “hooted
and yelled” and even resulted in some students gesturing graphically and
“simulated . . . sexual activities pointedly alluded to in [his] speech.”97 The
student was subsequently disciplined and suspended from school.98 The Fraser
Court determined that the First Amendment does not protect such lewd and
plainly offensive speech, drawing from the Manual of Parliamentary Practice,
which was adopted by the House of Representatives and the Senate.99 The Court
stated that it can hardly be the case that “what is proscribed in the halls of
Congress is beyond the reach of school officials to regulate[.]”100 Thus, a line
was drawn in the sand, supporting restrictions on student speech that would be
considered “highly offensive to most citizens.”101
89. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504; see also DRIVER, supra note 62, at 74.
90. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
91. Id.
92. DRIVER, supra note 62, at 73.
93. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
94. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513; Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1177–78 (9th Cir.
2006) (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509).
95. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678–79 (1986).
96. Id. at 677–78.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 678–79.
99. Id. at 681–82.
100. Id. at 682.
101. Id.
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Subsequent lower court cases followed the Fraser standard, upholding
bans on profane speech, clothing displaying offensive remarks, and students
displaying the Confederate flag on school grounds. An example includes a
district court upholding disciplinary measures under Fraser for shirts displaying
“Drugs Suck!,” finding that the connotation of “suck” can be deemed lewd and
sexual in nature.102 That court noted that restrictions on potentially lewd
language must be taken “in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment.”103 Thus, among sixth, seventh, and eighth grade students, it was
reasonable for the school to restrict the t-shirt choice.104 So, arguably, in the
context of older and thus more mature students, such a restriction would not be
supported.105
Additionally, a shirt adorned with the word “BELIEVE” with “LIE”
highlighted in red along with “Marilyn Manson” aside a three-headed Jesus
figure was deemed “contrary to the educational mission of the school.”106 While
the dissent was concerned about implications of viewpoint discrimination, the
majority held that it was well within the school’s latitude to prohibit the message
promoted by the shirt—an apparent “pro-drug persona” held by Manson.107
Notably, the Confederate flag was deemed plainly offensive under Fraser’s
standard, and schools are within their right to prevent the presence of the flag on
campus.108 As the Eleventh Circuit put it, the Confederate flag evokes choice
words such as “symbol, heritage, racism, power, slavery, and white supremacy,”
which are deemed “highly emotionally charged,” yielding “[r]eal feelings—
strong feelings.”109 Reasonably so, the court was concerned with the “unhealthy
and potentially unsafe learning environment” that would occur should the
Confederate flag be allowed on school grounds.110
In effect, Fraser held that student speech can be deemed plainly offensive,
lewd, or vulgar based on factors, such as the community in which the message
is given,111 the public perception of the meaning of certain profane or vulgar
words,112 and if the message could have the potential to be disruptive to the
mission of the school.113
102. Broussard v. Sch. Bd. of Norfolk, 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1528, 1537 (E.D. Va. 1992).
103. Id. at 1537 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
104. Broussard, 801 F. Supp. at 1537.
105. See id.; Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2049 n.2 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[Mahanoy]
does not involve speech by a student at a public college or university. For several reasons, including the age,
independence, and living arrangements of such students, regulation of their speech may raise very different
questions from those presented here. I do not understand the [Mahanoy] decision . . . to apply to such students.”).
106. Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 467, 471 (6th Cir. 2000).
107. Id. at 470.
108. Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua Cnty., 324 F.3d 1246, 1249 (11th Cir. 2003).
109. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
110. Id. at 1247.
111. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682–83 (1986); Broussard v. Sch. Bd. of Norfolk,
801 F. Supp. 1526, 1537 (E.D. Va. 1992).
112. Broussard, 801 F. Supp. at 1537.
113. Scott, 324 F.3d at 1248.
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Not a far step from values expressed in Fraser, the Supreme Court in Morse
held that schools have the absolute right to prohibit pro-drug related rhetoric
during school sanctioned events.114 In this instance, a student unfurled a banner
displaying “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” while off campus during the 2002 Olympic
Torch Relay as it passed through Juneau, Alaska.115 The students were allowed
to attend the Olympic Torch Relay during school hours and were being
supervised by school officials, namely the principal.116 The Supreme Court
stressed that political speech is “at the core of what the First Amendment is
designed to protect.”117 However, even under such circumstances, there is a
compelling interest in deterring drug use by schoolchildren where allowing
student speech to celebrate its use—while at a school event—would reasonably
pose serious difficulties for those entrusted with the care and development of
children.118 Thus, the Supreme Court found a new bright line, separate from
Tinker and Fraser, that schools may discipline students for pro-drug speech on
and off campus at school sanctioned events.119
Morse further articulated that Tinker still held that schools “may not
prohibit student speech because of undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance or a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”120 Instead, Morse held that a
school’s concerns around student drug abuse prevention extend “well beyond an
abstract idea to avoid controversy” and thus can be restricted.121
The Supreme Court limited Morse’s application to the prevention of prodrug rhetoric on school grounds and at school sanctioned events.122 Since its
inception, Morse has been expanded by lower courts as a method for
“automatically squelch[ing] student speech that allegedly threatens violence.”123
One such instance includes the Fifth Circuit upholding school discipline for a
student’s self-proclaimed work of fiction that starkly resembled “a Columbinestyle attack on a school.”124 The Fifth Circuit sidestepped Tinker, finding that
the substantial and material disruption test was inadequate to address free speech
questions on violence and mass shootings in schools.125 The Fifth Circuit found
that, similar to concerns of the dangers of drugs on youth development,
discipline in response to speech expressing potential violence and mass
114. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007).
115. Id. at 397.
116. Id. at 396–97.
117. Id. at 403 (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (plurality opinion)).
118. Id. at 407–08.
119. Id. at 410.
120. Id. at 408 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 508, 509 (1969)).
121. Id. at 408–09.
122. Calvert, supra note 55, at 1170.
123. Id. at 1169.
124. Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 766 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Calvert, supra note 55,
at 1170.
125. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 770–71.
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shootings in schools should be construed under Morse.126 Today, Morse stands
to bar pro-drug and violent-themed speech.127
Speech subject to Tinker, Fraser, and Morse requires consideration of
whether the school must tolerate a particular type of student speech.128
Conversely, under Hazelwood, speech can be censored if the circumstances and
manner of the speech would give the perception that the school is affirmatively
promoting or accepting a student’s speech, among other factors.129
Hazelwood asserts that a school may affirmatively censor student speech
in certain, yet broad, circumstances.130 Hazelwood involved middle school-aged
students who were enrolled in a journalism course where, as a part of unit
completion, the students would write stories for their school newspaper,
Spectrum.131 The school unilaterally elected to remove two of the six total pages
set for publication that involved topics on teen pregnancy and divorced
parents.132 The students sought relief in court, claiming that their First
Amendment rights were violated on account of the school’s censorship.133
The Court stated that regulations can be imposed to ensure that the students
are learning what a course or activity is designed to teach.134 The Court further
stated that the contents of Spectrum, for example, should not be inappropriate
for the audience, and “that the views of the individual speaker are not
erroneously attributed to the school.”135 This included “associat[ing] the school
with any position other than neutrality on matters of political controversy.”136
The Hazelwood Court justified this departure from Tinker in finding that the
school’s journalism course “may fairly be characterized as part of the school
curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long
as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart knowledge or
skills to student participants and audiences.”137
This authority can extend to “school-sponsored publications, theatrical
productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members
of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”138
This concept has been reinforced in cases following Hazelwood where the public
might have the impression that the school is endorsing speech that occurred

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 771–72.
Calvert, supra note 55, at 1170.
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1988).
Id.
See generally id.
Id. at 262–63, 268.
Id. at 264.
Id.
Id. at 271.
Id.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 271.
Id.
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during curricular activities.139 In an Eleventh Circuit case, the court considered
whether a school sanctioned extracurricular mural painting project could be
considered curricular.140 The court considered two factors.141 The first was
whether the activity occurred under the supervision of faculty, and second was
whether the activity was designed to give students or audiences particular
knowledge or skills.142 The court found that, although the activity was outside
of school hours and voluntary, there was sufficient evidence that the activity was
supervised by a faculty member—a teacher—and artistic skills and selfexpression were imparted to students.143 Thus, that court found the mural
activity sufficiently curricular under Hazelwood.144
Under Hazelwood, there is greater discretion and deference to the school
when censorship is of student speech that could be perceived by the public as
endorsed or accepted by the school, that is, school-sponsored speech.145
Undoubtedly, Hazelwood’s broad discretionary latitude can certainly present
issues for a student athlete participating in protest.
In relevant First Amendment jurisprudence, it is important to highlight that
courts have frequently dispelled concerns that requiring schools to allow certain
affinity groups on campus and school-related clubs would have the effect of
conveying school approval of such messages.146 The Supreme Court has rejected
the notion that allowing military recruiters on campus in Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic and Institutional Rights conveys school acceptance of military
practices,147 and equally rejected that a student organization’s own newspaper
print in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia would be
attributable to the school’s own values.148
In response to Hazelwood, some states have enacted statutes that
effectively supersede the school’s wide discretionary latitude under this
precedent.149 These statutes have been dubbed “anti-Hazelwood” laws.150 At
least six states have enacted anti-Hazelwood statutes including Kansas,
Arkansas, California, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Colorado.151

139. Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach Cnty., 387 F.3d 1208, 1214 (11th Cir. 2004); R.O. v. Ithaca City
Sch. Dist., No. 5:05-CV-695, 2009 WL 10677063, at *18 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2009).
140. Bannon, 387 F.3d at 1214–15.
141. Id. at 1214.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1215.
144. Id. at 1214–15.
145. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1988).
146. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841–42 (1995); Rumsfield
v. F. for Acad. & Inst. Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65 (2006).
147. 547 U.S. at 65.
148. 515 U.S. at 841.
149. Mike Hiestand, Understanding “Anti-Hazelwood” Laws, NAT’L SCHOLASTIC PRESS ASS’N,
http://studentpress.org/nspa/its-the-law-understanding-anti-hazelwood-laws (last visited July 1, 2022); see also
Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 166–68 (D. Mass. 1994).
150. Hiestand, supra note 149.
151. Id.
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B. THE COLLEGIATE ATHLETE: AN UNANSWERED QUESTION AT THE
SUPREME COURT
To date, the Supreme Court has not decided whether students at public
universities have the constitutional right to protest in their capacity as athletes.
Some lower courts have begun to contemplate this question. The Tenth Circuit
and a District Court in Kansas each heard cases involving disciplinary action
taken against collegiate athletes who have protested in their athletic capacity.
In Williams v. Eaton, the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the
University of Wyoming had a right to prohibit student athletes from protesting
and thereby the right to dismiss the athletes from the team as a result of
noncompliance.152 There, Black athletes on the University’s football team
intended to wear black armbands in protest of “alleged inhuman racist policies
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints [the Mormon Church] . . . .”153
These students presented a set of demands to the football coaching staff, which
included (1) ceasing any financial interest in hosting game play with schools
affiliated with the Mormon Church, namely Brigham Young University (BYU);
(2) requiring athletic directors in their conference to refuse to schedule with
BYU; (3) allowing Black athletes to protest during any contest with BYU as
long as the Mormon Church maintains their alleged inhuman, racist policies; and
(4) requesting that “all white people of good will, athletes included, protest with
their Black fellows” and wear a black armband as a symbol of that protest.154
The Tenth Circuit addressed the constitutional implications of disciplining
student athletes who participated in that protest under the Tinker standard.155 The
circuit court noted that it was lawful for the University to limit and subsequently
discipline the student athletes’ protest because, under the neutrality requirement
of the Free Exercise Clause, it would be equally violative to permit such a
protest.156 The court focused on religious expression of BYU affiliates as a key
component of this case.157 The consequence of supporting the demands in this
protest—condemning Mormon ideologies of BYU—would be a public
university, a state actor, disparaging religion.158 However, the court did not go
that far. Invoking the lesser-known Tinker standard, the protest was considered
hostile expression invading the rights of others.159 Thus, the Tenth Circuit
upheld disciplinary action taken against the student athletes as constitutional
under Tinker.160

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

468 F.2d 1079, 1080 (10th Cir. 1972).
Williams v. Eaton, 310 F. Supp. 1342, 1344 (D. Wyo. 1970).
Id.
Williams, 468 F.2d at 1083.
Id.
Id. at 1083–84.
Id. at 1083.
Id. at 1084.
Id.

July 2022

FROM SCHOOLHOUSE GATE TO LOCKER ROOM DOOR

1611

A decade and a half later, the United States District Court for the District
of Kansas heard Hysaw v. Washburn University, addressing, in part, whether
Washburn University violated the constitutional rights of student athletes who
participated in protests by removing them from their athletic team.161 Black
athletes protested racial mistreatment while attending the public university and
playing for the Washburn University football team.162 The protest resulted in
student athletes missing practices and positional meetings, which were required
as a condition for their athletic scholarships while attending the University and
playing on its football team.163 However, by coaching staff policy, missed
practices and positional meetings were considered excused in light of their
protest.164 While the University alleged that the protests caused substantial
disruption to other players on the team, the court did not agree.165 The court
stated that “it stretches the imagination to envision how an absence allegedly
sanctioned by the coaching staff could be disruptive.”166 The court further found
that it “[would] not place the interests of participants in a university
extracurricular activity above the rights of any citizen to speak out against
alleged racial injustice without fear of government retribution.”167
Williams and Hysaw are marked examples where collegiate athlete protests
have been subject to scrutiny in court. However, scholarship has not addressed
how the Supreme Court will treat collegiate athletes exercising their First
Amendment rights during game day activities.
III. THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY STUDENT ATHLETE HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO PROTEST ON GAME DAY
This Part explores how current First Amendment jurisprudence would treat
a student-athlete protest that involves kneeling during the national anthem and
wearing non-uniform gear during pre-game and gameplay.
A. STUDENT ATHLETES ARE STUDENTS FIRST AND FOREMOST WHILE
ATTENDING PUBLIC UNIVERSITY, AND THUS HOLD THE RIGHTS AND
PROTECTIONS OF STUDENTS AND LIKEWISE ESCAPE THE BURDENS OF
EMPLOYEE STATUS
A university may attempt to assert in court that student athletes should be
subject to the more restrictive employee free speech framework because of their
status and contractual scholarship obligations, echoing the arguments posed by
Republican lawmakers.168 A court is likely to disagree with the university’s
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

690 F. Supp. 940, 946 (D. Kan. 1987).
Id. at 945–46.
Id. at 946.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Summers, supra note 9.
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stance for two reasons and, instead, find that the proper framework for a student
athlete should be construed under a similarly situated non-student athlete on
campus. First, under limited student athlete free speech cases, lower courts have
consistently, and without question, analyzed the student athletes’ rights under
student speech jurisprudence.169 Second, student athletes have petitioned the
courts for the benefits of employee status, such as minimum wage, but are
continually denied those benefits.170 It would be wrong to say that student
athletes cannot gain the benefits of employee status but must instead suffer the
burdens.
Very few collegiate student athlete protests have made their way to court.
In the few that have, lower courts have used the student free speech precedent
in their analysis.171 Specifically, Hysaw and Williams each analyzed free speech
concerns under the Tinker framework to determine whether a particular student
athlete was rightfully disciplined for engaging in protest.172 These two cases
emerged in the 1970s and 80s.
Student athletes have even attempted to gain employee status, but denial of
those benefits have been upheld by the courts.173 In California, former
University of Southern California football player Lamar Dawson petitioned the
courts for employee-benefit status.174 Dawson claimed that the high revenue
generating status of his sport weighed in his favor, but the Northern District of
California disagreed, stating that “the premise that revenue generation is
determinative of employment status is not supported by the case law.”175 In
interpreting the Fair Labor Standard Act and applying its economic realities test,
the Northern District found that Dawson’s scholarship did not create an
expectation of compensation, thus granting defendants—the National Collegiate
Athlete Association and the Pac-12—their motion to dismiss.176 Relying on a
decision out of the Seventh Circuit,177 the court noted, “[s]imply put . . . studentathletic play is not work, at least as the term is used in the FLSA.”178 The Ninth

169. See generally Williams v. Eaton, 468 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir. 1972); Hysaw v. Washburn Univ., 690
F.Supp. 940 (D. Kan. 1987).
170. Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 294 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Dawson v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 932 F.3d 905, 913–14 (9th Cir. 2019).
171. See generally Williams, 468 F.2d 1079; Hysaw, 690 F. Supp. 940.
172. See generally Williams, 468 F.2d 1079; Hysaw, 690 F. Supp. 940.
173. See, e.g., Berger, 843 F.3d at 294; see also Dawson, 932 F.3d at 913–14.
174. See generally Dawson, 932 F.3d 905; Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401
(N.D. Cal. 2017).
175. Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 407; see also Kyle Bonagura, Ex-USC Player Lamar Dawson’s Lawsuit
Against NCAA, Pac-12 Dismissed, ESPN (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/
19242998/ex-usc-football-player-lamar-dawson-lawsuit-ncaa-pac-12-dismissed.
176. Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 403.
177. The Northern District of California relied on a 2016 decision that found student athletes were not
entitled to the benefits of employee status under the Fair Standards of Labor Act. See generally Berger, 843 F.3d
285.
178. Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 405 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Berger, 843
F.3d at 293).
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Circuit then heard Dawson’s case and upheld the lower court’s finding.179 As it
stands today, student athletes are not considered employees.180
The future remains somewhat unclear and could drastically change the
current student athlete analytical framework discussed in Part II. In the summer
of 2021, the Supreme Court heard Alston, an anti-amateurism requirement
petition under a theory of anti-competitive market restraints.181 Most
concernedly, terminating the amateurism requirement could change the way
courts analyze student athlete protests and, thus, could mean that student athletes
in their athletic capacity would no longer reap the benefits that Tinker currently
provides. Instead, student athletes could be subject to employee free speech
jurisprudence. While there was an effective end to the amateurism requirement,
nothing in the opinion implies or expressly finds that the student athlete is now
an employee of the University.182 The fact remains that the student athlete does
not have the benefits of employee status, and thus they cannot be silenced with
the burdens of the employee status.
B. THE GREATEST OBSTACLE FOR TODAY’S STUDENT ATHLETE:
OVERCOMING HAZELWOOD
A university will likely contend that Hazelwood is the proper framework
to analyze game day protest, given that it has the broadest reach to restrict
student speech. While courts have often applied Hazelwood to mostly student
newspapers and similar publications, Hazelwood does have language in its own
opinion that could be construed quite favorably for a university. The Hazelwood
Court stated that school-sponsored speech can be found in “school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students,
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
imprimatur of the school.”183 Additionally, a university would likely argue that
students who bear the name of their university on their chest are representatives
of the school. Thus, subsequent expression by student athletes in uniform could
be perceived as accepted or promoted by the school, as was the concern in
Hazelwood.184 This concern was highlighted by Republican lawmakers,

179. Dawson, 932 F.3d at 913–14.
180. Press Release, Donald Remy, NCAA Chief Legal Off., NCAA Responds to Union Proposal,
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/press-releases/ncaa-responds-union-proposal
[https://web.archive.org/web/20210603095919/https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/pressreleases/ncaa-responds-union-proposal] (last visited July 1, 2022).
181. See generally Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021); see also Nina
Totenberg, Take to the Court: Justices Will Hear Case on Student Athlete Compensation, NPR (Mar. 31, 2021,
5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/03/31/982836334/take-to-the-court-justices-will-hear-case-on-studentathlete-compensation; Amy Howe, Justices Employ Full-Court Press in Dispute over College Athlete
Compensation, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 31, 2021, 5:33 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/03/justicesemploy-full-court-press-in-dispute-over-college-athlete-compensation.
182. See generally Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141.
183. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
184. See id.
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asserting that student athletes are representatives of the school and even of the
state.185
Generally, when a court finds that certain student expression may “bear the
imprimatur of the school,” a court will identify whether the activity in question
is curricular.186 To define “curricular,” the Hazelwood Court articulated that
“[t]hese activities may be fairly characterized as part of the school curriculum,
whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are
supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or
skills to student participants and audiences.”187 Specifically, “curricular” is
defined as (1) supervised by faculty, and (2) imparting specific skills to the
participant or the audience.188 It is clear from Hazelwood and subsequent lower
court cases that nontraditional activities outside of the classroom can be deemed
curricular and are determined on the facts of each case.189
In the context of game day protests by student athletes, there are two
significant hurdles that a university must overcome in order for Hazelwood to
control. First, there is reasonable room for disagreement on whether game day
protest would bear the imprimatur of the school. As the Supreme Court found in
Rosenberger, a school’s requirement to allow a school student club’s
expression—even in direct affiliation with the school—could not be argued as
giving the public a perception of school endorsement.190 It follows from this
reasoning that it is unreasonable to argue that expression by a school-affiliated
athlete or team gives the perception of school approval of that expression.191
However, even if a court were convinced that a student athlete’s expression
was sufficient to give public perception of school endorsement, game day
activities will fail to meet the curricular requirement for applying Hazelwood.192
It can hardly be disputed that athletics impart skills to a participant.
Athletics teach time management, teamwork, and discipline, to name a few. It
can also hardly be disputed that public university athletic departments and their
staff—not faculty members—are the responsible supervisors of their athletes
while in their athletic capacity. There are few examples of athletic staff at
universities also holding a position as a faculty member. Absent such rare
circumstances, it cannot be held that game day activities are curricular and
subject to Hazelwood. With two significant hurdles for universities to
overcome—faculty supervision and public perception of school approval—a
court will likely look to the seminal First Amendment cases, Barnette, Tinker,

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Summers, supra note 9.
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach Cnty., 387 F.3d 1208, 1215 (11th Cir. 2004).
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841–42 (1995).
See id.
See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.

July 2022

FROM SCHOOLHOUSE GATE TO LOCKER ROOM DOOR

1615

Fraser, and Morse for guidance on what is considered a reasonable restriction
against student athletes.
But even if the Court were convinced that Hazelwood standards could be
met, the fact remains that a “bedrock principle” of the First Amendment is that
“speech may not be suppressed simply because it expresses ideas that are
‘offensive or disagreeable.’”193 More recently, game day protests have been
related to Black Lives Matter and racial injustice, both of which are political
speech. In other words, it would seem to fall into a category of speech beyond
the school’s regulatory reach because it “is not expressly and specifically
directed at the school, school administrators, teachers, or fellow students” and
instead addresses “matters of public concern.”194 Use of Hazelwood, given the
age and independence of adult collegiate athletes, would circumvent the First
Amendment’s bedrock principles and thus, as political speech, should be
properly analyzed under Barnette, Tinker, Fraser, and Morse.
C. UNDER THE PROPER STANDARDS, STUDENT ATHLETES WILL BE ABLE TO
PROTECT THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PROTEST AS STUDENTS
DURING GAME DAY EVENTS WITHIN REASON
Given that Hazelwood would not and should not be deemed the proper
framework for examining student athlete protest, courts will turn to Barnette for
the student athletes’ right to kneel during the national anthem and in the
alternative, to Tinker. Courts will analyze non-uniform gear under Tinker unless
subject to Morse and Fraser. Under such analyses, courts will protect collegiate
student athletes’ constitutional right to protest, within reason.
1. Protecting the Student Athlete’s Right to Kneel During the Anthem
In protecting the student athlete’s right to kneel during the national anthem,
courts will first look to Barnette and in the alternative to Tinker. Barnette will
control in circumstances where courts find that kneeling is no different than
simple nonparticipation in patriotic events under compelled speech principles.
Likewise, Tinker will control in circumstances where a court finds that kneeling
presents its own affirmative message and viewpoint.
Under Barnette precedent, a court will likely find that a student athlete at a
public university cannot be compelled to stand or remain standing for the
national anthem.195 It is without a doubt that standing for the national anthem is
considered a patriotic act with significant pro-military undertones.196 Not only
did the Supreme Court state in Barnette that requiring students to pledge
193. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2055 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
194. Id.
195. See W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641–42 (1943).
196. J.G. Noll, Here’s What the Military Community Is Saying About the National Anthem Protest,
MILSPOUSEFEST, https://stg.milspousefest.com/heres-military-community-saying-national-anthem-protest (last
visited July 1, 2022).
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allegiance to the flag would be considered as compelled speech, but it went
further to state that requiring participation in patriotic ceremonies generally
would also be considered as compelled speech.197 The Court addressed opposing
concerns noting, “[t]o believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic
ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to
make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds.”198
The Court further articulated that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”199
The Pledge of Allegiance and the national anthem are substantially similar,
and both ask the audience to stand, face the American flag, and either state a
pledge or stand in silence.200 The Free Speech Clause generally protects an
individual’s right to speak their own mind and extends to protect an individual
from being required to speak against their will.201 Compelled speech
jurisprudence additionally does not require actual words to be spoken but
includes expressive, non-verbal acts against an individual’s will.202
A court will have little difficulty finding that compelling a student to stand
for the national anthem is no different than compelling a student to stand for the
Pledge of Allegiance.203 Thus, a policy or rule implemented by public
universities to require student athletes to stand during the national anthem would
be deemed unconstitutional under the First Amendment in following
Barnette.204
While it seems clear that a university could not force a student athlete to
participate and stand during patriotic ceremonies under Barnette, a court may be
compelled to find that kneeling sends its own affirmative message, separate from
simple nonparticipation. To apply Tinker, a court would first need to determine
whether the expression made by kneeling is subject to an exception under Fraser
or Morse.
Student athletes have taken a knee in recent years during the national
anthem to shed light on racial inequality, police brutality, and violence towards
people of color in America.205 The Fraser Court determined that lewd, vulgar,

197. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Conduct expected during the national anthem is well-known but additionally codified in 36 U.S.C.
§ 301. Similar conduct codification for the Pledge of Allegiance is found at 4 U.S.C. § 4.
201. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634.
202. Id. at 632–33.
203. See id. at 633.
204. See id. at 642.
205. Victor Mather, Kentucky’s Team Took a Knee. Some in the State Were Taken Aback., N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/sports/ncaabasketball/kentucky-basketball-kneeling.html;
Wyche, supra note 1.
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or plainly offensive language can be prohibited on school campuses.206 Here,
there is no significant lewd or vulgar undertone expressed by kneeling. A court
will not deem a viewpoint lewd, vulgar, or plainly offensive, solely on grounds
that it is considered “unpopular” for the political message it bears.207 Likewise
under Morse, it can hardly be said that kneeling is a promotion of violence itself
or pro-drug rhetoric.208 Thus, the proper framework for protecting an affirmative
viewpoint would be found under Tinker.
A court will undoubtedly find that under Tinker, kneeling does not
substantially and materially interfere (1) “with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school” or (2) with the rights of others during
game day activities.209 While communities have responded with anger on social
media and are displeased by student athletes’ choice to kneel, no disruption by
fans or athletes to the normal course of game play have occurred to date.
Kneeling expresses no pointed attack towards others and does not interfere with
the rights of others. Kneeling peacefully expresses a desire for people of color
to be seen and heard, and for justice. Thus, a court will find that Tinker certainly
protects the affirmative message expressed by kneeling.210
2. Protecting the Student Athlete’s Right to Wear Certain Non-Uniform
Gear During Game Day Activities
Student athletes additionally have the constitutional right to wear certain
non-uniform gear during games and warm-ups. In analyzing these cases, courts
will look to Tinker’s substantial disruption test; to Fraser’s lewd, obscene,
vulgar, or plainly offensive rule; and to Morse’s prohibition on violent and prodrug speech.
Shirts worn during warm-ups that display messages, such as “Black Lives
Matter,” “I Can’t Breathe,” and “Arrest the Cops Who Killed Breonna Taylor”
are protected under Tinker because the messages do not materially and
substantially interfere (1) “with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school” or (2) with the rights of others.211
Like the black armbands in Tinker, these messages simply represent a
political viewpoint, even if not the most popular in a given community.212 The
shirts are worn to express disapproval of racial injustices and inequities in
America, just as the armbands in Tinker expressed disapproval of the Vietnam
War.213 Athletes will continue to go about their game play, as they always do

206. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
207. Id.
208. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 398, 410 (2007).
209. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (internal quotations
omitted).
210. See id. at 506.
211. See id. at 513.
212. See id. at 510–11.
213. See id.
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after completing warm-ups, and their choice to wear a shirt expressing a
viewpoint has not and will not substantially or materially disrupt the game.214
It should be noted that a message similar to “Arrest the Cops Who Killed
Breonna Taylor” could be argued to have a different effect than shirts displaying
“I Can’t Breathe” or “Black Lives Matter.” The university may argue that this
message is a more pointed attack at a small group of individuals, pointing to
Tinker’s second rule stating that a student’s free speech cannot substantially
interfere with the rights of others.215 Thus, the Court may turn to the Tenth
Circuit which applied the second Tinker rule in the context of student athletes at
public universities.216 The Williams court focused on the religious rights of those
being “targeted” by the message of the armbands, concerned with a statement
that was not neutral in the context of religion.217
Analytically, a message imploring America to seek justice on behalf of
Breonna Taylor does not infringe on the rights of others in the same way that the
Tenth Circuit was concerned with an exercise of free speech that could override
the rights of others under the Free Exercise Clause. Instead, similar to protecting
a shirt displaying President George W. Bush as the “International Terrorist,”218
the Breonna Taylor shirt is an expressive, political viewpoint asking for
accountability and change.219
On the other hand, discipline of student athletes would likely be upheld if
the message attacked groups based on protected categories220 or their relevant
constitutional rights.221 Notably, this second Tinker rule has long been held by
courts as dicta and has rarely been applied.
When it comes to game time—just like any other warm-up gear—there is
a reasonable competing interest to require participating players to remove any
shirts interfering with visibility of their uniform during game play. A court

214. See id. at 514.
215. See id.; Williams v. Eaton, 468 F.2d 1079, 1084 (10th Cir. 1972) (stating that the school’s decision
“protected against invasion of the rights of others by avoiding a hostile expression to them by some members of
the University team.”).
216. See generally Williams, 468 F.2d 1079.
217. Williams, 468 F.2d at 1084 (reasoning that the “mandate of complete neutrality in religion and religious
matters [served] as the basis for the [trial] court’s ruling[]” and subsequently affirming the trial court’s findings).
218. See Barber ex rel. Barber v. Dearborn Pub. Schs., 286 F. Supp. 2d 847, 849 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
219. Breonna Taylor’s death has sparked rigorous political debates around the use of force and no-knock
warrants for law enforcement and racial bias in the United States. Additionally, her death inspired conversations
around qualified immunity for police officers and holding officers accountable for crimes against citizens. Will
Wright, After Breonna Taylor’s Death, Black Engagement in Kentucky Politics Soared, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/13/us/breonna-taylor-death-anniversary.html; see also Ben Tobin &
Sarah Ladd, How Protests over Breonna Taylor’s Death Have Changed the Political Landscape, LOUISVILLE
COURIER J. (Sept. 9, 2020, 10:13 AM), https://www.courier-journal.com/in-depth/news/local/breonna-taylor/
2020/09/04/breonna-taylor-protests-100-days-later-here-political-angles/5686191002.
220. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding disciplining
a student for wearing a jacket displaying “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL” was proper given that there
were clear implications for substantially interfering with the rights of others and targeting students’ protected
categories), vacated as moot by Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
221. See Williams, 468 F.2d at 1084.
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would likely find that this is not an unreasonable restriction since the referee’s
responsibilities at games would be materially and substantially disrupted if
athletes did not adhere to the rules and regulations of the sport that pertain to
jersey color, identification of players, and other aspects of uniforms. 222 By
contrast, requiring the removal of articles such as armbands or wristbands would
be prohibited unless the regulations of the sport specifically articulate a justified
reason, such as the safety of other players.223 Armbands do not have the effect
of substantially disrupting game play because—similar to the armband in
Tinker—the audience would be a passive witness.224 So long as the viewpoint
expressed by the armband—whether anti-war, anti-racism, or antiamateurism—does not actively target or harass another group,225 infringe the
rights of others, or violate a reasonable game play regulation, wearing armbands
will be constitutionally protected under Tinker.226
While many social justice related messages would be protected, Fraser
would draw a boundary based on the specific wording employed in those
messages. Messages using any sort of vulgarity, lewd language, or profanity,
could be prohibited and subsequent discipline may be deemed constitutional.227
Just as the Fraser Court stated, the First Amendment gives students the “right to
wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket,”228 which was famously
adorned with “Fuck the Draft.”229 Even though both messages were anti-war
viewpoints, word choice matters in the context of education. Thus, a message in
support of Black lives or in support of social justice and accountability would
be protected under Tinker, but a parallel message of “Fuck White Supremacy”
or “Fuck the Police” may be barred under Fraser.230 Similarly, under Morse,
messages that call for violence or threats of violence and messages that promote
222. It would likely be reasonable to say that, in order to carry out the duties and regulations of game play,
nothing blocking or obstructing the numbers or school names on the jerseys is allowed to be worn. See Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
223. A court would likely reason that player safety is a reasonable policy to allow restrictions of certain nonuniform gear, such as jewelry. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
224. See id. at 514.
225. See Williams, 468 F.2d at 1084.
226. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. There is also growing support from the National Collegiate Athletic
Association. Prior to the July 29, 2020 rule change, it would seem that the National Collegiate Athletic
Association, at least in football, was silent on a policy regarding messaging surrounding causes or organizations.
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON UNIFORMS AND CONTEST DELAYS
FOOTBALL – 2018–19, at 2, https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2018MFB_FAQ_Uniforms_Contest_
Delays_20180921.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20190713131425/https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/
2018MFB_FAQ_Uniforms_Contest_Delays_20180921.pdf] (last visited May 12, 2021). After the July 29, 2020
regulation change, student athletes all seem to have the National Collegiate Athletic Conference’s “blessing” to
seek authorization from their university to display certain messages. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N,
PLAYING RULES CHANGES RELATED TO COMMEMORATIVE/MEMORIAL UNIFORM PATCHES SUPPORTING RACIAL
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
(2020), https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/championships/resources/rules/2020PR_
UniformPatches.pdf.
227. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
228. Id. at 682 (internal quotations omitted).
229. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
230. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.
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drug use could be constitutionally prohibited and disciplined for violations
thereof.231
CONCLUSION
Student athletes have the constitutional First Amendment right to protest
during game day activities. Under Barnette, student athletes’ choice to
peacefully kneel is protected from requirements to stand during patriotic
ceremonies under principles of compelled speech. Likewise, the affirmative
message that kneeling expresses will be construed and protected under Tinker.
Game day uniform wear is subject to the reasonable rules and regulations
of game play. The referee must be able to properly administer the game,
differentiate players and teams from one another, and maintain the integrity of
competition. Pregame warm-up gear, such as shirts displaying “Black Lives
Matter,” “I Can’t Breathe,” and “Arrest the Cops Who Killed Breonna Taylor,”
are a different matter, and each are protected speech under Tinker because there
is no concern of substantial and material disruption. This is further evidenced by
the fact that student athlete protest has never caused a substantial disruption to
game play.
Universities will argue that their regulations are subject to the more lenient
standards of Hazelwood because the student athlete is not only a representative
of the school but additionally bears its colors and the university’s name on their
chest. Even so, collegiate athletics cannot be subject to Hazelwood. The
university will struggle to prove that the public perceives student athlete
expression as bearing the imprimatur of the school. Despite that requirement,
Hazelwood additionally requires the activity be under faculty supervision. Game
day activities are simply not supervised by faculty but instead the athletic staff
of the university.
When examined within the bounds of First Amendment jurisprudence, the
student athlete at a public university does not shed their constitutional rights at
the schoolhouse gate—much less the hardwood floor. Instead, student athletes
will favorably invoke Barnette and Tinker, successfully drawing the
constitutional foul.

231. Calvert, supra note 55, at 1170.

